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A year or two ago, one of my copyright students called 
to my attention a problem that seemed to him to pose 
unique difficulties for the copyright statute. The prob- 
lem arises because of a technology called digital sam- 
pling.' Digital sampling is a new threat to performers' 
rights that has grown out of the combination of digital 
recording technology with music synthesizer tech- 
nology. This threat is a very recent one. Indeed, the 
digital sampling problem is so new that copyright law- 
yers haven't yet figured out how to think about it. 
-".'~&&-~*g 4 
Digital Sampling 1 U.S. /+ and Digital recording technology enables one to recora a sound and encode it digitally in computer memory, which can then reproduce the sound absolutely faith- fully. A digital sample is a very short digital recording, 
only a few seconds long, that is analyzed and stored 
in the memory of a computer. Older synthesizer tech- 
nology enabled a computer to create music from 
computer-generated sound waves, although the result 
sounded a little metallic. If you plug a digital sample 
of a sound into a synthesizer, though, you can create 
music that sounds as if it's being played by the person 
who made the sound you recorded. Manufacturers 
have created products called sampling keyboards that 
combine the two technologies. And, over the last year 
or two, music created by using digital samples along 
with synthesizer technology has been showing up as 
backup music on many commercially released records. 
It's easy to see why. Using samples is less expensive 
and less trouble than hiring real performers. 
Record producers are increasingly sampling the 
sounds of musicians they record to build up their li- 
braries of sounds. And music created from these sam- 
ples shows up on other recordings, and in the music 
for television programs or commeraals, often without 
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the sampled performer's knowledge or consent. Mean- 
while, samples of commercially successful musicians' 
performances have become available in sample librar- 
ies and on the black market. Musicians with home 
recording studios are using the samples in their 
recordings. 
This cer tady seems to be the sort of situation that 
ought to give rise to a legal remedy. A performer's 
performance has all of the attributes of personality 
that we instinctively expect to receive legal protection. 
Although it may not be tangible, it smells like prop- 
erty. Using the performance without the performeis 
consent smells llke a tort. Legal protection of per- 
formances is nonetheless murky, and it isn't clear how 
the law would approach unauthorized use of digital 
samples. 
Recently, the Copyright Law Society of Japan asked 
me to give a lecture comparing the rights of performers 
under Japanese and U.S. law. I decided to examine 
how the laws of both countries would treat the pro- 
blems posed by the widespread commercial use of di- 
gital sampling. The United States and Japan take dif- 
ferent approaches to protection of performers' rights. 
Notwithstanding those differences, the commercial 
use of dgital sampling poses similar challenges 
to U.S. and Japanese law. 
Performers' Rights in the 
United States 
Performers in the United States can seek protection 
under a variety of federal and state legal theories. 
The obvious place to start exploring the protection of 
performers' rights is the federal copyright statute. 
The U.S. copyright statute defines copyrightable 
subject matter very broadly. Performers' performances 
are entitled to copyright protection as soon as they are 
fixed in tangible form. Sound recordings are copyright- 
able; and the performers' performances are part of the 
original authorship that entitles sound recordings to 
copyright protection. Audiovisual works and films 
are copyrightable; and the performers' performances 
are part of the original authorship that entitles those 
works to copyright protection. The copyright statute 
gives authors very strong economic rights, including 
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribu- 
tion and public performance. 
As a theoretical matter, then, United States copy- 
right law could offer performers very strong economic 
rights in their performances. As a practical matter, 
however, performers can almost never claim rights 
under the copyright statute. The reason for this is 
our "work made for hire" doctrine. The United States 
probably has the most expansive work made for 
hire doctrine in the world. It provides that any work 
created by an employee in the course of her employ- 
ment is a work made for hire, and that the employer is 
the work's legal author. Copyright in that work, then, 
vests in the employer upon fixation. The reason that 
performers can never claim rights under the copyright 
statute is that virtually all copyrightable works that 
embody performances are works made for hire. 
Almost all sound recordings, films, and television pro- 
grams made in the United States are made under con- 
tracts that expressly provide that the performers' con- 
tributions are works made for hire. The bottom line is 
that although the copyright statute gives the copyright 
owner the exclusive right to make reproductions of all 
copyrighted works, and the exclusive right to make 
public performances of copyrighted audiovisual 
works, the performer whose performance is embodied 
in these works is not the copyright owner and cannot 
exercise these exclusive rights. 
Rights in Unfixed Performances: State Common Law 
Federal statutory copyright does not vest in a work 
until the moment it is fixed in tangible form. There is 
no federal statutory copyright in performances that 
have not yet been fixed. Thus, federal law does not 
protect the exclusive right to record a live perform- 
ance. The only source for protection for unrecorded 
performances is the laws of the 50 states. Indeed, 
the federal copyright statute expressly preserves the 
power of the states to protect works that have not yet 
been fixed in tangible form. So far, however, few states 
have exercised that power. Only one state, the state of 
California, has a statute that gives protection to works 
that have not been fixed in tangible form. No cases 
have been decided under that statute. A handful of 
other states can be found that offered common law 
protection to unfixed works of authorship before the 
1976 federal Copyright Act preempted state protection 
of fixed works and preserved state protection of un- 
fixed works. In theory, such protection should remain 
available after the effective date of the 1976 Copyright 
Act. But, in the nearly 10 years since the 1976 Act took 
effect, no case has been reported in which plaintiff re- 
covered for infringement of common law copyright 
in an unfixed work or performance. So although the 
possibility of state law protection of unfixed perfor- 
mances exists in theory, the right of first fixation has 
not yet received protection from state courts. 
The Right of Publicity 
Performers have another source of rights under state 
law. That source is the right of publicity. In the United 
States, the right of publicity protects a celebrity from 
misappropriation of her name or likeness for com- 
mercial purposes. The right of publicity has also been 
used by performers to protect their performances. In 
states that recognize the right of publicity, performers 
have a tool that will allow some of them to prevent the 
unauthorized commercial exploitation of their unfixed 
performances, either by reproduction or broadcast 
communication. Indeed, performers have succeeded 
in some courts in recovering not only for unauthorized 
use of their performances but also for unauthorized im- 
itation of their performances. And courts have been 
tending to interpret the right of publicity with increas- 
ing breadth. Nonetheless, most courts require the 
claimed invasion of the right of publicity to involve a 
recognizable appropriation of a widely recognized 
feature of plaintiff's "identity." 
Because the right of publicity is a creature of state 
law, it varies from state to state. Some states interpret 
it very broadly; others interpret it narrowly; and still 
others refuse to recognize it at all. The most vexing 
characteristic of the right of publicity is the wide 
variations in the scope of the doctrine among the 
several states. 
Can the right of publicity be invoked by performers 
to protect the rights that they are unable to claim under 
the copyright act because they are employees for hire? 
The answer appears to be no. Courts have considered 
claims by celebrities that broadcasting of their per- 
formances by their employer and without their con- 
sent violates their right to publicity. Recently, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that so 
long as the performance of the employees was fixed 
in tangble form, the right of publicity claim was pre- 
empted by the federal copyright statute.* The court 
reasoned that the right of publicity being asserted was 
equivalent to a right of public performance in per- 
formances that had been created and fixed within the 
context of the employment relationshp. The copyright 
statute vests the right of public performance in the em- 
ployer, and preempts laws under which the employee 
could claim ownershp of essentially equivalent rights. 
Section 43{0) of the Lanhom Act 
United States law has another source for protection 
of performers' rights that I want to mention briefly: 
it has assumed increasing importance in United States 
intellectual property law. That source is section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act, a statutory section tucked in at the 
end of our federal trademark statute that courts have 
interpreted to establish a federal statutory tort of unfair 
competition. The gravamen of a cause of action under 
section 43(a) is that defendant has confused or misled 
the purchasing public about the nature or source of de- 
fendant's goods or services. Section 43(a) sometimes 
offers performers a remedy for claims that are not 
otherwise actionable. For example, Woody Allen's 
right of publicity suit against a Woody Allen lookalike 
was unsuccessful, but he prevailed a ainst the looka- 5 like in a claim based on section 43(a). In another case, 
the singer Charlie Rich successfully relied on section 
43(a) to enjoin the re-release of a 10 year old sound 
recording of his performance with a current photo- 
graph of him on the record j a ~ k e t . ~  An advantage of 
section 43(a) is that it is part of a federal statute rather 
than a creature of state law, so it is immune from 
federal preemption. 
I have briefly described four possible sources for per- 
formers' rights under United States law: the federal 
copyright statute, under which performers, as em- 
ployees, have no rights; state common law copyright 
which, in theory, gives performers a right of first fixa- 
tion and, in practice, does not appear to exist; the right 
of publicity, which offers performers a pastiche of in- 
consistent rights; and section 43(a), which offers per- 
formers who can prove public confusion the possibility 
of parasitic recovery based on the confusion. None of 
these legal doctrines was designed with performers' 
rights in mind. Performers who seek protection under 
them find that the situations they complain of fit into 
these doctrines very poorly. For that reason, most per- 
formers have looked to the labor unions that represent 
them to secure through collective bargaining the rights 
that the law has failed to provide. The labor unions 
that represent performers are relatively weak, and 
have not been very successful in their attempts to 
negotiate stronger rights for their membership. 
Performers' Neigh boring 
- 
Rights in Japan 
The situation in Japan is very different. The 
copyright law of Ja an follows the model of many S European nations: copyright vests, without any 
formal requirements, in works of authorship within 
designated subject matter categories. Performers' 
performances are not so designated and, thus, are not 
themselves subject matter entitled to copyright protec- 
tion. Sound recordings that embody performances 
of music are not copyrightable. Films are entitled to 
copyright, but the authorship embodied in a film or 
audiovisual work includes only the production, direc- 
tion, art direction and photography, and not the per- 
formers' performances. 
Japanese law protects performers by gving them 
"neighboring rights" (chosaku-rinsetsuken) that 
are independent of and different from the copyright 
granted to  author^.^ The Japanese neighboring rights 
were modeled on the provisions of the Rome Conven- 
tion of 1961,~ and give performers very strong rights 
in their unfixed, live performances, including an un- 
qualified right to authorize or forbid the recording of 
their live 
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weaker. The statute gives performers a very limited 
reproduction right over performances that have 
already been recorded or filmed.9 Performers also 
have a nominal right to equitable remuneration for 
commercial broadcasts of their fixed performances,'0 
and a limited public lending right.'' 
These rights are far narrower than their United 
States analogues. But they are essentially inalienable. 
Moreover, a performer's employment status does not 
affect them. Japanese law does not presume that all 
fruits of an employee's creative endeavor belong to her 
employer. Instead, the Japanese provisions for neigh- 
boring rights expressly preserve a limited set of rights 
in performers, whether employed or not. Nor do 
neighboring rights depend on a particular performer's 
fame or her audience's confusion. 
I have outlined the overall shape of United States 
and Japanese legal doctrine for the protection of per- 
formers. How do these doctrines apply to digital 
sampling? 
Digital Sampling Under 
U.S. Law 
The first instinct of American music lawyers when 
their clients came to them and complained that their 
performances were showing up on other people's rec- 
ords was to think about a copyright infringement suit. 
They immediately ran into problems figuring out how 
to think about it. 
Suppose, for example, that the digtal sound sample 
was taken with the performer's consent, but outside of 
the context of an employment relationship. Perhaps a 
fellow musician recorded it when playing around with 
her equipment. Using the sample in other recordings 
might violate the performer's copyright rights to repro- 
duce the woxk and to prepare derivative works, but 
only if the digital sound sample were copyrightable. 
And here we run into problems. First of all, a digital 
sound sample is itself probably too short to be 
copyrightable. The Copyright Office assimilates digital 
samples to other uncopyrightable building blocks of 
copyrightable expression: single words, brief phrases, 
discrete items of data or short dance steps. If the digtal 
sound sample is uncopyrightable, then it is not copy- 
right infringement to exploit it in other recordings. 
Even if the sample were held to be entitled to a copy- 
right, there are further obstacles. Under the U.S. copy- 
right statute, the copyright owner is entitled to pro- 
hibit any duplication of a sound recording, but may 
not prohibit imitation of it.12 We talk about this as a 
"dubbing" right: it covers record piracy and off-the-air 
recording, but not sound-alike records. And it is sim- 
ply not clear whether a United States court would hold 
that creating a sound recording through the use of di- 
gital sound samples is a use that involves duplication, 
rather than mere imitation. A defense lawyer could 
argue that imitation is the essence of digital sampling: 
a computer analyzes the attributes of a sound wave, 
stores its characteristics in computer memory, and 
then uses synthesizer technology to imitate the sound. 
If courts assimilate the use of digital samples to imita- 
tion rather than duplication, then the creation of new 
recordings from those samples would not be copyright 
infringement. 
Consider, instead, a situation in which the sample 
is taken from a copyrighted sound recording. We have 
some of the same problems, and some additional hur- 
dles as well. If the sample is taken from a copyrighted 
sound recording, the sound recording is copyright- 
able, but the copyright doesn't belong to the performer 
because the sound recording is a work made for hire. 
Assuming that there were a way over that hurdle, a 
copyright infringement action might fail on the ground 
that the accused recording was not substantially sim- 
ilar to the original sound recording, or that the amount 
taken was de minimis. After all, the sample is merely a 
few seconds long. The bottom line is that U.S. federal 
copyright law offers little protection of substance to the 
performer who has authorized the fixation of a digtal 
sound sample of her performance. 
What about bootleggmg, or unauthorized hat ion? 
State common law copyright might protect a performer 
whose live performance has been surreptitiously sam- 
pled. But there are no cases out there to look at, and it 
is entirely possible that states would find arguments 
that sound samples are mere building b!ocks and not 
protectable works of authorship to be compelling. 
This brings us to the right of publicity. The right 
of publicity should protect performers from un- 
authorized commercial exploitation of their perform- 
ances; so it would seem a perfect remedy. There are 
nonetheless significant obstacles to recovery. First, 
a sound recording may use music generated from a 
digtal sample of a performer's performance, without 
being widely recogruzable. Most courts deny recovery 
for unrecognizable uses of plaintiff's likeness or iden- 
tity; those courts would surely deny recovery for un- 
recognizable uses of plaintiff's performance. Secondly, 
most jurisdictions privilege "incidental use" of names 
and likeness, that is, use for purposes other than tak- 
ing advantage of the celebrity's reputation or prestige. 
Where the incidental use privilege is broad, the sort of 
appropriation involved in unauthorized use of digital 
sound samples would fall within it. Finally, there is the 
problem of preemption. If the performer has author- 
ized the sample's fixation in tangble form, state law 
causes of action for use of the sample would likely be 
preempted by the federal copyright statute. 
This brings us to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
and a ray of hope for the performer. Although there 
have as yet been no cases decided under section 43(a) 
on analogous facts, courts have interpreted it ex- 
pansively, and used it to make otherwise unactionable 
wrongs actionable. So long as consumers are not con- 
fused as to the provenance of sounds on recordings 
or programs, section 43(a) ought not to provide a 
remedy. Courts, however, have been generous re- 
cently in finding the requisite likelihood of confusion, 
and quick to respond to impressions of misappropria- 
tion with injunctions. 
No 43(a) suit has yet been filed. In the face of gloomy 
prognoses from their attorneys, performers aggrieved 
by the use of digital sound samples of their perform- 
ances in commercial sound recordings have tried to 
persuade their union to pursue the issue. Thus far, 
however, the union has failed to do so. 
Why is U.S. law so inhospitable to claims for this 
sort of injury? United States protection of intellectual 
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property is based on an economic incentive model 
rather than a natural rights model of personality. The 
bare fact that someone created something does not suf- 
fice to entitle that person to legal rights in her creation. 
Instead, U.S. law offers property rights as incentives 
for creation and concentrates those rights in the hands 
of those entities most likely to exploit them. A per- 
former's voice, or trumpet tone, is not something that 
the law envisions as more likely to be "created" if in- 
centives are available. Nor would giving performers 
property rights in their performances facilitate ex- 
ploitation. Indeed, the multiplicity of ownership that 
would result from giving property rights to each per- 
former in any given performance would significantly 
raise the transaction costs involved in the transfer and 
exploitation of those rights. Because unrestricted digi- 
tal sampling neither interferes with incentives for crea- 
tion nor burdens the exploitation of protected works, 
it may not invade any interests that U.S. law was 
designed to protect. 
Digital Sampling 
Under Japanese Law 
Japanese law embodies an approach that derives 
from natural rights, and expressly recognizes rights in 
performers. One might therefore expect it to be more 
favorable to performers than its U.S. counterpart. In- 
deed, under Japanese law, performers are in a some- 
what stronger position. Their statutory neighboring 
rights give them a right to prohibit unauthorized fixa- 
tion of their performances, and a right to prevent 
duplication of unauthorized fixations. If taking a digi- 
tal sound sample of a performance is deemed to be a 
recording of that an unauthorized sam- 
ple should violate performers' neighboring rights, and 
any reproduction of that sample should also be a viola- 
tion. There are. nonetheless. significant hurdles that 
" 
performers must overcome. '~o twi ths tand in~  the fact 
that Japanese law approaches issues of performers' 
rights differently from the United States, the obstacles 
performers face-in recovering for unauthorized uses 
of digital samples are similar. 
First of all, as in the U.S., it isn't entirely clear that 
a recording as short as a digital sound sample would 
constitute a reproduction of a performance. Second, 
even if a digital sound sample were deemed a 
reproduction of a performance, it is not completely 
clear that a new recording that incorporates music 
created from the sound sample would also be deemed 
a reproduction of the performance. Finally, taking and 
using a digital sound sample might be exempt under 
the Japanse statute's provisions permitting short, at- 
tributed quotations from performances if consistent 
with fair dealing.13 
If the perfor&s have consented to the sam- 
ple, then in addition to these hurdles we have a prob- 
lem of ownership. Under the Japanese neighboring 
rights provisions, the unqualified reproduction right 
would belong to the producers of the phonograms, 
which, under the statutory definition would seem to 
be whoever recorded the s a m ~ 1 e . l ~  Performers could 
prevent the sample's use in other sound recordings 
only in very limited situations. These would be weak 
rights, but they would be stronger rights than are cur- 
rently available to performers in the United States. 
Why is Japanese law not more favorable to perform- 
ers aggrieved by the unauthorized use of digital sound 
samples? Although Japanese law takes a natural rights 
approach to performers' rights, and accords perform- 
ers rights that are essentially inalienable, it defines 
those rights restrictively. Indeed, because the rights 
are inalienable and may be owned by a multiplicity of 
persons who may have conflicting interests, it is neces- 
sary that they be narrow in scope. Because digital sam- 
pling involves a new technology, it is difficult to pre- 
dict whether it is encompassed within the restrictive 
language of Japan's neighboring rights provisions. 
Japanese performers face, for different reasons, 
mar.y of the same obstacles as performers face 
under U.S. law. 
Conclusion 
Both the United States and Japan offer performers 
rights, but they are weak rights. Japan is more 
solicitous of performers than is the United States, but 
the development of new technology has outstripped 
the legal provisions in both nations' laws. United 
States law in this area has set its highest priority as 
facilitating the transfer and exploitation of rights by 
concentrating their ownership in the hands of few 
people: hence, our adherence to the work made for 
hire doctrine, which vests copyright in almost all per- 
formances in the performers' employer. Japan has 
been more willing to tolerate plurality of ownership, 
and the resulting restraints on alienation and exploita- 
tion of rights. But the development of digital sampling 
techniques strains the provisions made for performers' 
rights under both systems, because the way that per- 
formances may be exploited no longer fits comfortably 
within the language of either of our laws. 
The Rome Coizvention, upon which Japan's neighbor- 
ing rights provisions are based, is only a first step in 
protecting the rights of performers, and is already 
outdated. The provisions of the Rome Convention are, 
nonetheless, more generous to performers than cur- 
rent U.S. law. The United States is unlikely to join the 
Rome Convention and unlikely to amend its law to con- 
form with the convention's terms.15 Performers' pro- 
tection in the United States, then, is likely to continue 
to be based on a collection of diverse and sometimes 
inconsistent legal theories, providing a system of un- 
even and often unpredictable rights and remedies. 
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